SCP-3955
Safe
~
medium confidence
███-3955
Expected annual
$3.6M
One-time setup
$8.6M
Annual recurring
$3.6M
Personnel
10
One-time setup and hardening (emergency shutdowns, power redundancy, clean-room upgrades, and a catastrophic contingency reserve) drive most upfront cost (~$8.57M); annual operating and mitigation (staff, monitoring, takedown ops, opportunity cost) total roughly $3.59M/yr.
One-Time Capital Costs
Total: $8.6M
Annual Recurring Costs
Total: $3.6M/yr
Cost Scenarios
📊
Baseline
(baseline)
$3.6M/yr
Normal year with routine operations, training, monitoring, and no external incidents.
no leaks
regular audits pass
detector operates normally
🚨
Minor Incident
$3.9M/yr
A modest public leak or flagged audio requires emergency takedown, targeted legal actions, and use of small-response funds.
single public leak
targeted takedown/legal action
🚨
Major Breach
$11.6M/yr
Time Box malfunction or contamination event causing facility damage, mass remediation, medical response, and extended recovery.
Time Box catastrophic failure
facility damage / reality-anomaly remediation
🚨
Political Exposure
$4.6M/yr
Public exposure or whistleblower event that triggers heavy PR/legal response, increased monitoring and potential temporary research halt.
media leak
regulatory/political scrutiny
Personnel
10 total
| Role | Count | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Research Scientist (senior oversight) | 1 | [#7] Senior scientist overseeing CAOCIT policy adherence and detector program (salary included in staff_wages). |
| Technician / Lab Technician | 2 | [#7] Two technicians for day-to-day checks, experiments, and Time Box maintenance (included in staff_wages). |
| Security Officer / MTF Agent | 3 | [#8] Additional restricted-access security officers (midpoint of 2–4 used; wages included in security_staffing). |
| Analyst (digital takedown / monitoring) | 4 | [#16] Team of ~4 analysts supporting automated crawlers, takedown efforts and monitoring (salaries included in digital_takedown). |
Confidence Notes
Line-item estimates come from analyst notes with clear rationales for most categories (detector dev, clean-room upgrades, staffing). Uncertainty remains around tail-risk sizing (catastrophic reserve vs insurance), the scope of opportunity-cost accounting, and frequency of public incidents, hence medium confidence.