SCP-4804
Memetic
?
low confidence
SCP-4804
Expected annual
$17.5M
One-time setup
$44.7M
Annual recurring
$17.2M
Personnel
41
Initial setup and reserves are the dominant one-time costs (~$44.7M) driven by facility retrofits, potential MRI purchase, and a large scaling contingency; annual operations are ~ $17.2M driven by staff wages, subject compensation, surveillance/research, and covert public‑information operations.
One-Time Capital Costs
Total: $44.7M
Annual Recurring Costs
Total: $17.2M/yr
Cost Scenarios
📊
Baseline
(baseline)
$17.2M/yr
Normal operational year with cohort‑based research, no major containment incidents or large public exposures.
normal_operations
no_breach
steady_prevalence
🚨
Minor Incident
$17.7M/yr
Localized containment breach or limited public exposure requiring targeted response, short‑term legal/media mitigation and additional travel.
local_breach
minor_media_exposure
equipment_failure
🚨
Major Breach
$22.2M/yr
Significant containment breach affecting multiple subjects or larger media exposure that requires expanded quarantine, legal defense, and intensified public control.
containment_breach
widespread_media_coverage
multiple_subjects_affected
🚨
Catastrophic Contagion
$47.2M/yr
Confirmed contagious/mass‑prevalence event or uncontrolled memetic spread requiring emergency national/international scale‑up.
confirmed_contagion
rapid_prevalence_increase
international_pandemic_response
Personnel
41 total
| Role | Count | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Research Scientist / Research Staff | 18 | [#5] Core research team: 6senior researchers, 8 research staff/technicians, 4 data scientists (total ~18). |
| Medical Officer / Care Staff | 8 | [#6] On‑site physicians, nurses, clinical social worker, custodial trained staff (estimate midpoint of 6–10). |
| Security Officer / MTF Agent | 15 | [#7] 24/7 armed security with memetic hazard training (assumed midpoint of 12–20 guards across shifts). |
Confidence Notes
Estimates are based on analyst ranges but the underlying phenomenon is memetic/partially unknown (contagiousness unclear), and public‑control/legal needs are highly variable; large tails (scaling/contagion) dominate uncertainty.