SCP-5068
Unknown
~
medium confidence
SCP-5068
Expected annual
$1.3M
One-time setup
$1.1M
Annual recurring
$1.2M
Personnel
10
One-time capital/setup of $1,105,000 driven by BSL-3 fit-out, redundancy and contingency reserves; recurring operating costs ~ $1,215,500/year driven by staff wages, D-class program, research surveillance, and contingency.
One-Time Capital Costs
Total: $1.1M
Annual Recurring Costs
Total: $1.2M/yr
Cost Scenarios
📊
Baseline
(baseline)
$1.2M/yr
Normal year with no major incidents; routine operations, research, and daily D-class activations.
routine_operations
no_incident
🚨
Minor Incident
$1.4M/yr
Localized contamination or personnel exposure requiring temporary shutdown, targeted decontamination, extra sequencing and medical monitoring.
minor_leak
D-class_noncompliance
localized_contamination
🚨
Major Breach
$1.7M/yr
Significant containment breach requiring full facility decontamination, replacement of equipment, extended shutdown, and legal/medical responses.
glass_barrier_failure
widespread_internal_contamination
multiple_staff_exposures
🚨
Catastrophic Breach
$6.2M/yr
Escalated incident leading to environmental release or outbreak, major litigation, multi-site response and long-term shutdown.
environmental_release
public_exposure
MK-class_event
Personnel
10 total
| Role | Count | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Research Scientist / Microbiologist | 2 | [#8] Two dedicated microbiologists (research/lead) included in scientific staffing. |
| Microscopy Technician | 1 | [#8] One microscopy technician to run live-imaging and sample staging. |
| Engineer / Maintenance (Containment Technician) | 1 | [#8] One containment engineer/technician for BSL systems and maintenance. |
| Bioinformatician (part-time) | 1 | [#8] Part-time bioinformatician (counted as 1 staff resource) for sequencing analysis. |
| Security Officer / Guard | 5 | [#9] Four guards plus one supervisor to provide 24/7 site security and overlap. |
Confidence Notes
Line-item cost estimates are detailed and mostly concrete, but major uncertainties remain around required biosafety level, the necessity of daily human activation versus robotic replacement, and low-probability high-impact breach costs; these factors reduce confidence to medium.