SCP-515
Keter
~
medium confidence
SCP-515
Expected annual
$104.9M
One-time setup
$198.0M
Annual recurring
$89.0M
Personnel
50
Foundation operational one-time capital ≈ $198M (secure sites, tracking assets, contracts, lab/HW); recurring operational baseline ≈ $88.99M/yr driven by staff, astronomical monitoring, and a modest intercept reserve. Systemic economic exposure (if an object impacts) is tracked separately — a modeled regional 1–5 km impact is estimated at ~$200B one-time; truly multi-10 km/global impacts are unquantifiable and not something the Foundation can budget to prevent.
One-Time Capital Costs
Total: $198.0M
Annual Recurring Costs
Total: $89.0M/yr
Cost Scenarios
📊
Baseline
(baseline)
$89.0M/yr
Normal year with routine containment, monitoring, maintenance, and modest R&D/preparement funding; no escape events that trigger major searches or intercept missions.
no escape
no imminent-impact trajectory identified
routine operations only
🚨
Minor Incident
$94.0M/yr
Short-term containment failure or local escape requiring a concentrated multi-day search/recapture and modest PR/legal response.
temporary restraint/tamper sensor failure
short-term off-site discovery requiring local search
limited local exposure requiring legal/compensation measures
🚨
Major Breach
$609.0M/yr
Extended uncontrolled motion or escape that produces an imminent impact trajectory for one or more SCP-515-1 objects of a size the Foundation and partners can credibly attempt to intercept (e.g., sub-5 km). Triggers large recapture operation and at least one intercept mission mobilization.
extended uncontrolled locomotion / escape
imminent impact trajectory for a sub-5 km object
international coordination to mount intercept/deflection
🚨
Catastrophic Impact
$99.0M/yr
A trajectory for a very large SCP-515-1 object (multi-10 km) where preventing impact via deflection is effectively impossible for a single organization. The resulting global consequences are systemic and largely outside the Foundation's ability to prevent.
multi-10 km object on impact trajectory
failure of any feasible interception option
global-scale humanitarian crisis
Personnel
50 total
| Role | Count | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Security Officer / MTF Agent | 30 | 24/7 on-site armed security force to maintain containment and rapid response teams; shift coverage and redundancy require ~30 staff. |
| Medical / Behavioral Staff | 8 | Trauma surgeon(s), neurologist(s), sleep researcher(s), psychiatrist and nursing/EMT staff on-call and scheduled rotations. |
| Research Scientists / Orbital Modelers | 6 | Physicists, orbital dynamicists, forensic/tamper researchers and data scientists to maintain trajectory models and investigate escape mechanisms. |
| Technical / Operations (engineers, pilots, IT) | 4 | Facility engineers, pilots for medevac, IT/HPC administrators and systems engineers for monitoring/comms. |
| Administrative / Legal / Liaison | 2 | Administrative support, legal and liaison staff handling agreements, partner coordination and cover-story maintenance. |
Confidence Notes
This re-evaluation corrects the prior report's large unitemized 'catastrophic reserve' by (a) explicitly zeroing any single-organization line for attempting to defend against multi-10 km bodies (infeasible) and (b) itemizing feasible Foundation expenses for routine containment, tracking, intercepts of smaller objects, and R&D. Numbers for routine operations and moderate incidents are reasonably constrained by componentized salary, equipment and program estimates; tail-risk systemic damages remain highly uncertain (noted and separated). Probabilities are subjective but conservative; overall confidence is medium due to high tail-risk uncertainty and dependence on partner-state capabilities for intercepts.